

Why I write ?

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Despite the fact that I did not write anything in my childhood, as far as I can remember I have always wanted to write something, although what I wanted to write was not that much clear.

———— Knowledge, light and shade ————

Throughout my school years, I had been naturally enclined to mathematics - later I chose to learn this discipline in more depth at the university - which favours intellectual rigour more than other faculties of the mind, and thus bequeathes one with the ability to detach from one's own inclinations in terms of ideas, in pursuit of reaching a form of truth which stands still beyond the discourse as such. I would say as well that the organization of one's own thoughts is considered to be desirable in mathematics, in order to optimise the way to reach this form of truth. One downside effect of focusing exclusively on these faculties however is that in practice it often implies some control over which seeds of thoughts end up inhabiting the mind - even for a short period of time - and if this control is not done properly it ends up erasing from the mind several things that are actually of use in the regulation (and thus health) of the mind. These mechanics of thoughts regulation appeared clear when I was standing in front of the list of mathematical problems that the teacher requested the students to solve for the upcoming class (after some time of practicing mathematics, I actually liked thinking about how I found the solution more than the fact that I found it): finding the solution of a problem involves first making present to the mind some ideas that come naturally with simple contact with the problem statement (sometimes because the form of the problem reminds me something that I have seen in the class, or with time it can remind me of another idea that I had on another problem, sometimes because I think that 'it would be nice if..'), then taking some time to evaluate the adequateness of this idea to the problem or eventually the ability of this idea to trigger other ones which would get me closer to a solution, and finally decide whether to keep it in my representation of the *situation* around this problem. I would say that the main thing that this exercise taught me is not to get some pride from the fact that I had been able to find the solution, because out of the observation of my own thoughts I had to recognize that I only had control over my attention, focalizing it on the problem. With enough patience, the solution would come without much effort (of course this was because it was of relatively elementary level and not that of research).

Learning mathematics is quite interesting for someone who wants to understand the mechanics of thoughts, but its practice might also inhibit these very thoughts if other faculties of the mind are not maintained and expanded. Although I wanted to write, I could not. I believe that the reason was the following: I was not thinking in adequation with the practice of writing itself; in contact with the blank sheet, despite the fact that I had the beginning of an idea of what to write and how to write it, I would not be able to go further because there was no clearly *right* way to proceed that would emerge, as it happens when an idea unlocks a way to the solution of a mathematical problem. With an application of the selection mechanics that I discussed

above, I systematically rejected my own thoughts and nothing would come out of my mind to be thrown on the paper (of course at this time I was not aware that I was exporting some thoughts mechanisms from the practice of mathematics to another domain).

When I think about this, I would say that it is in fact the difficulty of expression in a more abstract sense that led me to mathematics: in situations which are embedded in life, there is no way to decide with certainty what to do or what to say. While doing is unavoidable, actually speaking is a choice in most situations. Around this subject, I remember a movie that I watched some time ago in which an adolescent, Dwayne, who chooses not to talk, is asked why he is doing so. He answers silently, pointing at the portrait of F.Nietzsche (the movie is *Little miss Sunshine*). I believe that there is no right interpretation for this scene, however for me it illustrates well what I would like to express: despite the right intention of F.Nietzsche to construct a philosophy of systematised destruction (of all the mental philosophical construction which are oppressing the mind instead of opening it), it may leave a lot of doubts about then: how to decide what I should say, and more importantly not to say, provided the impact of words (in constituting false beliefs) ? That is this doubt that I felt in Dwayne's response to the philosophy of Nietzsche, for the reason that I had myself this kind of doubts. I would not engage into non-speaking because I believed that it was the right thing to do, but I would not speak because I perceived words as having too much impact. I could not decide what was the right thing to say at particular moments, and since speaking is a choice, I would rather remain silent whenever I could.

In the world of mathematics all this is different. The general feeling I had towards mathematics when I had to learn them was a certain relief, some security in inhabiting this world, whereas I understand that other persons could feel somewhat constrained. The most fundamental reason for this is that mathematics restrict the possibilities of what can be said. I can say for instance, looking at a geometrical drawing: *there is a triangle*, or *all its edges have the same length* (observation), or *because of this all its angles have the same value* (deduction); one can exhaust the things to say and grasp them altogether in a singular representation. When in front of a mathematical problem, there is a choice in the articulation of such statements, but they are restricted in the aim of finding some solution to the problem. Furthermore I think that mathematical words (including mathematical symbols and formula) have no impact on in the 'real' world (of course psychologically, because mathematics do have an impact), and one can speak without having to care about this impact. In fact when I make a mathematical statement, I am not its cause because its truth imposes itself on me (and on others as well, and this way they also know that I am not the cause of this statement). In particular I can not hurt others with these words, because what these words tell them does not depend on me. Furthermore these words are not ambiguous and for this reason I know that no one can attribute to me the intention to hurt in interpreting what I say. They all together feel like a *cognitive ground* on which the mind can walk confidently, without having to navigate over the swirling ambiguous waters of 'real' language.

With mathematics I learnt how to speak, and with time I learnt how to make myself cognitive tools in order to be able to speak in the world and about it, and thus actually entering in a relation with this world. The mathematical language acted for me as a first medium of this relation, or of a prototype of it. It happens that when I direct my attention in this world with a certain idea or question, of the type: *is it possible that.. ?*, this works as a perturbation of some world of interconnected ideas; after that this perturbation triggers a chain of causal reactions which I am not able to register and report, something appears there that I can hold long enough at least to reorientate my thoughts towards another direction. Just like we make interpretations out of dreams after they happen, I make an interpretation of this response as an answer to my question, or another question. Some mathematicians have made similar observations about how their mind works while searching for the solution of a mathematical problem (for instance H.Poincaré or

B.Russel). Here, however, what I would like to see is an exchange between the 'I' who is coming in this world of mathematics, that I see as an area of my cognition, 'somewhere' that I know how to localize unconsciously without having access to the precise coordinates, as a form of relation. In fact what becomes knowledge or intuition out of my presence there affect my thoughts not only locally but more deeply, as if it was diffusing to other areas of my cognitions, just as a conversation with another person can change the way one thinks. As I change *my* world changes and in its appearing remains offering other lands of exploration: this is freedom. I believe that what we should call a relation is the regular co-presence with something which answers to my presence and reacts in a specific way to my words and actions in such a way that I feel free in it.

In a sense this relation with the world of mathematics is simple because the presence of the mathematical is unambiguous. However the concentration of my attention to the world of mathematics made me *forget* the existence of a more diverse world, which is not however 'the' world out-there (the material one, which does not contain all that exists, and to begin with, mathematics) ; it is still my world but involves my whole self towards which my relation is thus without internal conflict: a world which I had inhabited as a child but without knowing that it could be different and that it would eventually become different - because of this I did not think about 'imprinting' its form in my mind to find it back later.

Mathematical understanding in the contemporary world is often considered as the exemplum of knowledge, a form of light that is shed on what had been obscured and thus not seen in the way it has to be (a symbol that was used, amongst other things, to name a founding point in history for this contemporary world: *Les Lumières*). The reason why this is so convincing to see knowledge in this way is that it can create in our minds objects that were not 'there' before: it has a certain power, and power is, in our minds, the sign of truth. It appears clear to me now that light itself can be obscuring in its own way, as it makes us forget what still lies outside of it in its shade; in particular this part of the self which despite its obscurity still matters in the relation of 'I' to the world (which native american call shadow, and that we nowadays call the unconscious). I believe that it is not possible to come to a proper understanding of the world without understanding how I come to know this self and actually know it better.

———— Reassembling the shattered self (an attempt) ————

In fact what 'I' am is how I interact with *my* world. Along with this reflection it appears clear that what I want to write about is actually this self, and the possibility, which lies in me, of its unity, which in a sense is the projection in this world of something which exists prior to it and triggers in me this idea (because I can not conceive the unity of my self without having a concept of what unity is in the first place). I discovered how to speak when I actually found anything that one formulates is justified well enough by the intention of communication towards the other which comes with the act of speech. This was a fundamental change on the way I was looking at other intellectual disciplines (than mathematics), and led to some thirst of understanding other ways of thinking (in particular in the literature). In this freedom and with some time I developed several ideas that I found original (for the reason that I could not find them in what I was reading, and in a sense came out of the relation with my readings). Of course these ways of thinking that I discovered were in the mind of the others in actuality, but they were and had been also in me in potentiality. I was not aware at this time that I was actually re-creating my own world, creating thus some distance with 'the' world in which the others surrounding me were living together. I wanted to communicate how my mind was working to the others in order to appear in 'the' world as I was in *my* world. As my attention was running in many directions of wonder, the method that I found in order to do so was: (i) first to collect all the ideas that seemed beautiful to me when they came to my mind, without further selection except the one of memory (of what I wanted to say when I noted them), on whatever I was thinking about in

the world; (ii) second to find in their collection some natural (hidden to my mind) structure and organisation, a sort of structure of what 'I' am in totality which I am not aware of and can not be without this collection on the paper, because otherwise my thoughts appear to me dispersed in time and situations.

This is what I planned to do in my mid-twenties. After some time it appeared clear to me that it was leading to some endless work, and too much effort for something I was doing on my spare time - not because writing is hard but because writing this way is. Furthermore when someone tries to consider and study one's own existence, this existence is re-created out of this very study: as a consequence it is impossible for me to find a form for the text I write in such a way that this text would contain even a rough representation, even over a certain restricted period of time, the structure of '*my thoughts*'. I know some people who might think this was predictable, since human existence can not be captured in systems of thoughts, no matter how hard one tries, without distorting it. However I choose to believe that it is possible to say something about human nature, as long as in doing so we think in the right way, in particular not forcing the form of this discourse to follow standard modes of acquisition of 'knowledge'.

On the other hand it is right to wonder: why would I have to write in order to understand myself? A simple and regular practice of introspection could work as well, especially because some of these practices have been out-there for some time, engaging in a dialogue between me and my hidden self in an incarnated relation, without the medium of the script. For the common sense, the script is a tool which, when directed towards the society of (abstract) unknown others, is meant to communicate useful information, whether this information takes the form of facts, concepts or ideas; when it is directed towards known others, it serves as further communication, beyond information, of emotions and presence. In particular the script is not meant for understanding oneself. I do believe though that with the practice of writing it is possible to overcome some barriers that even well executed introspection can not: in particular it enables me not only to create original ideas and concepts but also another way of thinking, and thus create for myself a whole space in which all is possible. Before actually writing I would like to suppress possible cognitive barriers and formulate to myself the *write way* to follow.

————— Overcoming egoism —————

To the question: *why does anyone write?* the cynical might answer that it is a matter of ego: \mathcal{I} (I will denote \mathcal{I} instead of 'I' in order to designate the abstract category of all possible 'I') write for the reason that writing makes me exist out-there in the world, at least the world which matters, meaning in the mind of the others (in other words \mathcal{I} matter, \mathcal{I} am important). More abstractly \mathcal{I} have some causal impact and thus a form of power on their minds, as well as the ones who know that \mathcal{I} write and am read, in the sense that \mathcal{I} have the possibility to create there an image of myself which corresponds to how \mathcal{I} perceive myself, potentially (and probably) distorted by the tendency to select, in drawing the picture of ourselves that we hold in mind, the aspects that are pleasant over ones that are not. This way \mathcal{I} virtually liberate myself from the causal impact of others in general on this image \mathcal{I} hold of myself. In particular \mathcal{I} have some control over the way I write things, putting forward the extent of my knowledge of facts or the awareness and care of what surrounds me (the world that \mathcal{I} inhabit and on which \mathcal{I} have an impact), the elegance of my writing style or the capacity that \mathcal{I} have to convince others, my capacity to abstract from common language and to assemble words in order to create meaning which does not exist yet. All these things have in common that they are commonly and collectively valued, as they are assets for some valued functions in the society of the others; without explicitly stating these qualifiers, the association is made naturally when reading and egoism in writing consists in the imagination of the writer of projecting this association on the abstract reader, and thus back to the writer.

I shall notice here that it is possible through the script to regulate this image in a more rational way, which means not holding some picture of myself no matter what and using the script as a mirror which reflects some aspects of my personality which I unconsciously put away from my direct experience. If \mathcal{I} choose not to share this script, I avoid the violence of the critics towards myself.

I can not say that I have never been subject to egoism at all. However with time I came to think that in this situation where the ego is the center of the relation to the script, \mathcal{I} deny the obscure part of myself which I should in fact try to know better, since it has an impact on my world and as a consequence on 'me' in return. As a matter of fact egoism consists precisely in ignoring this unknown, as well as the infinite flaw of any subject which is to know almost nothing about itself. This ignorance derives from both natural doubts about oneself and the belief that others do not have such doubts: the consequence is that \mathcal{I} am enclined to hide these doubts by superimposing on them a form of strength.

When it comes to the writing itself (and not more refined aspects of myself that I associate with myself through this medium), one of these strengths that is the most effective in the mind of others and thus on my own mind (as \mathcal{I} can perceive its pressure) is the simple quantity of what \mathcal{I} have written, which comes along with the common belief that this quantity evaluates well the conceptual power of the \mathcal{I} who writes, and thus this \mathcal{I} itself. The natural quest of value through this quantity is also endless, since it can not be intrinsically bound. Furthermore if \mathcal{I} bind my own value to it, \mathcal{I} become a prisoner of the writing practice, the production of another *unit of writing* raising again as a priority as soon as the last one has ended, priming over my well-being, and thus losing any relation with meaning and the conceptual quality of what \mathcal{I} actually write.

This is manifested in a prominent manner in the academic world, as well as in individuals who have been in contact with this world and keep a positive representation of it, most often through the educational system: \mathcal{I} would like to write in order for me to be the person that \mathcal{I} think \mathcal{I} should be, which is a product of the action on my mind of the collective valorisation through writing. What \mathcal{I} actually desire is this value of myself in the eyes of the others. This is then for writing that \mathcal{I} collect and refine my thoughts, and cultivate them in study, assemble them and make them interact inside a unit of writing, which gets me closer as a producer of this unit of writing, to value.

———— A work of presence: towards the others or oneself ————

Even when stripped of the action of ego, \mathcal{I} can still write for myself, for my personal growth. One way is to write in order, rationally, to make myself present to the others, furthermore accepted by and situated in the society of these others. This presence and existence allows me to act on this society: \mathcal{I} am seeking to acquire value, not for the image but in order to have means to act. However having a situation in this society could make me lose contact with the cognitive situation in which I started the project of writing: the one in which I discovered I could *think*, meaning that I have the ability to create original ideas and concepts out of myself. Of course this is not possible in complete isolation and can be inspired from some readings and discussions with others, but I do not need to be embedded in a social structure for that to happen, for I find in myself the very cognitive operations which are involved in this creation out of the raw observation of my relation with the world. In acquiring a situation in the society of others, this relation with the world becomes controlled and entirely captured by existing concepts: purely novel ideas can happen only in contact with the unexpected. Furthermore having a name out-there allows the others to assign causality to my identity and personality to this social situation: as \mathcal{I} become *someone who writes*, \mathcal{I} acquire an identity towards the others, which restricts the range of possibles, not only in terms of possible relations to the world but also about why, what and in which form I write. From the individual point of view, the exteriority of the determination

of the why, or even worse the precedence of the form over the what, can be quite frustrating. On the other hand when \mathcal{I} write towards the others, proving the pertinence of my way of thinking and attracting the attention of others on my ideas can allow me to engage in some discussions with others that \mathcal{I} would not have otherwise, communicating ideas which do not come up in trivial discussions, and develop them further. From a more individual point of view, \mathcal{I} can stand this way above the undifferentiated landscape of the world *out-there*, in which one sees almost no one, where \mathcal{I} stand only as a cognitive machine, one which is only used by the society for the society. This way \mathcal{I} am seen as an \mathcal{I} , as a singularity, which \mathcal{I} absolutely am: the difference is that \mathcal{I} am seen as \mathcal{I} am. In a sense writing this way can lead to a certain form of freedom. This will to exist for the others and the attraction of this form of existence from an individual point of view are to be differentiated from the action of ego. On the other hand, in the will to be heard, \mathcal{I} can tend to over-exist in the relation with others, preventing the others to exist in this relation. In this case \mathcal{I} will probably be ignored by others despite appearances.

I think this is important that before writing towards the others, \mathcal{I} write towards myself, because what comes out of this way to write is ensured to have meaning. In a sense the stages I have drawn thus far (egoism, writing towards the others, towards oneself) are similar to Kierkegaard's existential stages. The last stage is difficult to reach and is difficult in itself. I found out that a good criterion is to be able not to say a word about the fact that I write and what I am writing, at least in the process of writing it. Writing for oneself is difficult for the reason that \mathcal{I} would like to write a text with some structure, in which the meaning appears clearly, which can be read as *something*, all this out of which comes out of my mind. In fact it is relatively easy to have ideas about the world and to take notes of them, of what \mathcal{I} think when \mathcal{I} think: \mathcal{I} only need to focus for some moment and choose the right words to project my thoughts in the language (and recover them later). I personally am interested in various questions about the world, and I regularly take notes of my reflection about these questions. I take advantage of every situation I am in to enrich my reflection and when I find an interesting idea I just take down some notes, and I usually do it right when I am thinking about it because I know that later I will probably forget about it, or remember only partially. Sometimes I can find for instance in an experience the final element for the constitution of a concept which materializes a deep intuition, itself resulting from multiple past experiences, or an interesting illustration of a concept which sheds some light on it. While it is relatively feasible to find the right words to imprint in them a local idea, it is more difficult to establish a set of relations between my own ideas (can \mathcal{I} explain the origin of an idea in another ? what does this idea bring to what \mathcal{I} already know ?), concepts and experiences - especially in a structured way - since they altogether form the person who bears them (that is the meaning of the word 'subject'). Finding a structure for the script is important for the text to be readable: even if \mathcal{I} write towards myself, my aim is still to be able to read the text and take something out of it, and that it can bring some change in me in a form of a rupture in the mode of being which characterises me right now. A good indicator is that \mathcal{I} am able to find something different in it than what \mathcal{I} projected in words in writing, but also that \mathcal{I} find some pleasure in reading the text. In a sense finding this structure is taking myself as an object to observe - objectively then - and introducing some distortion in the representation I have of myself. The various notes of the thoughts that I take when they are interesting to me provide a representation of myself for they are the very cognitive place where I choose to go when I do not have constraints (they form a sort of data set about this 'where'); however with finding a structure in them I am able to *understand* myself and not only observe. The difficulty with this is that \mathcal{I} can not begin writing a script with some structure in mind (because this structure is an introspective projection over the observation which is corrupted for I can not grasp myself entirely in one singular thought): the structure has to be created along with the practice of writing (in a sense this consists in a sort of machine learning on some data about myself, where the machine is myself in the time of

writing).

———— Writing without immediate control ————

The structure that I am talking about is of causal nature: thus writing not having a pre-determined structure in mind means suspending causal considerations over what \mathcal{I} am thinking at the moment and how it relates to what \mathcal{I} thought immediately before. In practice this consists in writing only without immediate retro-action on what \mathcal{I} write, beginning with the projection of the simple state of my mind in the present moment (whether it consists in a question, an idea, intuition, an impression, an image, etc) and unfolding the thread of associations which derive in my mind from this simple state, without exerting control over the appearance of the script, just like when \mathcal{I} dream. This is out of this material of causal relations between states of mind that \mathcal{I} can fabricate a structured script. Furthermore the way \mathcal{I} appear to myself then is more faithful to how I really am. Aftermath \mathcal{I} can conceptualize this material, detecting some regularities in my thoughts, and reassembling these regularities into a structure. In a sense the script consists in an augmentation of the reflection upon myself - which consists in observing my own thoughts during my spare time, when I do not have anything to do, in the subway or the train for instance, when inactivity leaves these thoughts appear in my clear mind, realizing that I should have or should have not done or said such or such thing, or reacted in such and such way - by externalizing my memory. Conceptualizing myself helps constructing other ways to behave and adopting the habit to do so (in general a theoretical 'proof' that such a thing is the 'right' thing to do helps in taking habits), and externalising memory helps because despite some efforts \mathcal{I} forget about these thoughts, especially when my mind is occupied with many responsibilities and worries, that I lack time to think again before some time has passed, or simply that I am unconsciously escaping the effort of taking a closer look at negative sides of my personality (which \mathcal{I} tend to accentuate in an objective representation of myself, paralyzing then my relation to the world). The local distortion of my consciousness that \mathcal{I} operate through the script in understanding myself, which is possible because of the identification between me as a spatio-temporal continuity and what I do perceive in the regularity of my writings, allows me to change the very form of my actual consciousness: beginning with the detection of an objectal structure and then the extraction of some of the objects involved; then with the presence in my mind of these objects, when I have new experiences, perturbing the way \mathcal{I} conceptualize them and leading to another vision and understanding of the world.

In order for this way of writing to be possible \mathcal{I} need to force myself, although this is sometimes difficult, not to erase anything immediately after writing it. The reason is that \mathcal{I} tend to perceive negatively anything which \mathcal{I} write which does not correspond to how this actually appears to me when I think about it, however letting this be written the way it is is necessary because otherwise there would never be anything out-there on the paper to be taken objectively and eventually modified to correspond to what I have in mind: at this stage words do not serve to convey meaning, but for the writing as a marker pointing at some ideas. I thus force myself to let the text grow indefinitely (and this is something that I measure locally and not globally). After I have written things on the paper, the text appears to the readers (including the writer) in a simple container for dispersed and unordered meanings (where a 'meaning' here can be considered as an elementary and local action on the mind of the reader, in particular the action of pointing in the mind of the writer): these meanings do not collectively point at some direction. Every script is such a container but for a text to be read (without necessarily having a global meaning) the reader has to be able to navigate in it without having to read the whole text, in particular in order to understand the text, in the sense of perceiving some causal relations between parts of the text (which consist in statement like *'the author says this because he said this previously and because he noticed that'*).

I believe that the choice of a form for a text (in particular whether it is a piece of theater, an essay, etc) should reflect the reason why the author writes, for this form actually influences how what is written is perceived. When the author knows this reason, he or she is able to detach from exterior determinations (for instance tradition) on the form of the text and only consider its relation with the content: this way more can be created and displayed, and ultimately understood. In particular when this content is made out of the observation of immediate experience, the form of the text should reflect the form of the mind and if this mind does work in a discontinuous way at the moment. For instance if some ideas appear which are different from what I have decided to think about, leading to another direction in my thoughts, \mathcal{I} should not prevent myself from following this direction for the reason that the discourse would not appear continuous and coherent. Actually I think that no meaningful text can be written following a 'program' set in advance which determines its content. On the contrary, a meaningful text, since it reflects the writer's mind, is a form of labyrinth in which the reader is partially directed (which is the only thing the writer can do), and led ultimately to one way out the writer has found out in the practice of writing itself, or another possible one which the writer himself or herself did not see (in fact I think that the meaningfulness of the text consists precisely in this open horizon). Of course in order to take anything out of reading some text, one has to follow at least for some time the trail that the writer is drawing. I think that it is worth noting here that some philosophers (for instance F.Dostoïevski, M.Proust, or later F.Kafka, W.Gombrowicz) chose to communicate their ideas in the form of novels for the reason, I believe, that their whole could not be communicated in an essay for instance; in particular the novel allows some discontinuity in the philosophical content, since the characters involved do not think collectively in a continuous way.

From the point of view of the writer, I think that the exploration of this labyrinth still needs some map, which represent some possible directions to take. For me this map is the text itself in the course of writing, constituted of markers which trigger back some thoughts when reading, which I can follow again or not (if the way they draw reveals to be sterile). Sometimes I also follow two paths at the same time, which is possible since sometimes ideas can appear in the mind while it is occupied with thoughts about a completely different subject. Thus I see the map as some tree: naturally its branches grow not uniformly but according to where the light is. At some point in the course of writing I have an idea of some form for the text, and I have to cut some of the branches. However I can never cut them without letting them grow first.

———— The '*I*' and the collective use of script ————

These days I am thinking about the desire to write that I had when I was younger as a call from deep inside of something whispering me to communicate to the outside what I actually am inside, as if this something knew that it was a good thing to do for my well-being. This is really similar to sexual desire, which can be seen as a call for the creation of a relation with another person. Just as the desire to write, sexual desire can be corrupted by the thirst for the approbation of others or to exist towards the others, narcissism through the other. The simple temporary satisfaction of this desire leaves one with some feeling of incompleteness which is the sign that the real purpose of the desire is something else. I believe that understanding and intelligence of the phenomenal structure of desire is certainly of use in order to eliminate ways which seem evident at first sight but actually lead nowhere, and ensure the stability of the choice not to follow these ways.

This deep desire to write, which unfolds in the desire to transform raw experience into material for my reflection and materialize my own intuition in conjunction with this reflection, and some things that I see personally as true, deep and, most of the time, unseen (or at least that I did not find in any of my readings), enters into contradiction with the position that I have in the

society of the others. This contradiction is often felt at the beginning of an academic career which comes with the will to integrate oneself in the academic system, which leads one to adopt a mode of writing which consists in the realization of a social function, defined by the society of others itself (that of sharing ideas and knowledge, primarily to other researchers and ultimately to the mainstream, in a format which makes them accessible to as many people as possible). This is why I am questioning here the reasons for which I would like to write, and find the right way to settle this conflict. The difficulty of this lies in the fact that the expectations of the society are somehow artificial, in the sense that they do not correspond to the reality of the intellect, and the frontier between the two modes of writing that I mentioned is blurred, for instance because sometimes in my research work I can find the solution to a problem by fixating my reflection on an intuition which takes time to realize and might not correspond to anything material. I choose to focus on this way of doing research because I am interested in how intuitions relate to things, but of course this is not the way which allows an efficient production of 'knowledge'. Sometimes I also think that the kind of choices that I am making to focus on some ways more than others are completely determined by my subjective vision of world and is not universal - universality that would justify for me to capture the attention of the others onto my work. I still believe that there is an objective meaning that can not be determined strictly by productivism. In fact, in all possible configurations, the way I choose to write, which consists in a direct and personal relation to the truth and meaning, stands in contradiction with the systematisation of the academic world. The solution could be simple: to leave this world; however as I left it for a moment, I know that what there is out-there is not better. I thus need a solution for the duality of my position, for which 'I' is bifold: there is the 'I' who wants to integrate this world and its system as a consequence, and another 'I' who wants to think and write in its own way. Questioning the reasons for me to write consists in the question of the coexistence of these two 'I' and thus: *why I write?*, *why I write ?*, *why II write ?*. Where should I stand between the two polar '*social forms*': of the persons which are perfectly integrated in the academic system, adopting its purposes - defined in a 'collective' way - personally and the ones who are perfectly excluded for rejecting these same purposes. In drawing attention towards this opposition, I am touching upon a paradox inherent to the collectivization of intellectual creation and production: while this creation is and has to be initiated by the human mind to the human mind, or more precisely the human mind which thinks, this creation is assigned to a machine (although a social machine) : that of the human community in its most abstract extension. In between the two poles I believe there exists a zone of ambiguity where pure creation towards the others is possible, but with intermediate means, in between the individual and the abstract community.

———— Multiplicity and unicity in the script ————

In order to find this intermediate way, I need in particular to find out how the form of the script derives from what the writer wants to say (instead of following what the others do, often for the reason that *this is how it is done*). I will thus think of the script of an author as the totality of his or her intellectual production: how is this totality divided into units (books, articles, blog posts, etc) ? When writing towards oneself, in the scrutiny of one's raw experience one can make the (trivial but subtle) observation that this experience is decomposed into 'things' (which can be material objects, ideas, concepts, or even feelings) that \mathcal{I} identify and then group into sets of things, where \mathcal{I} is not the main factor in these operations, and which constitute (by assembling) my world, and my understanding of this world consists precisely in the representation of its decomposition into things and their interactions. Even when they are written on the paper, the kind of ideas that I am interested in, which may change in particular the way I understand the world, are as volatile as air (and in fact this is the reason why my mind is relatively stable in its form). In fact \mathcal{I} am able to perceive the presence to my mind of an idea - which is itself perceptible

as an object - or its importance, meaning the causal impact it *can* have on my understanding of the world, \mathcal{I} can not describe precisely this impact without displaying the way my thoughts are organised. The reason for this is that in raw experience the idea itself is not present to my mind long enough for this description to be visible to me consciously: only the sign of the impact of this idea is. I believe that the purpose of dividing the script into a sequence of units of writing is that the meaning of each of the units, which bears some unity of the sort that 'things' have in my perception field, is to provide a cognitive context in which volatile ideas are anchored with words, and the unity of the unit is what allows me to access these ideas without effort: in the structure of the text, these ideas have an address where \mathcal{I} can find them. Furthermore the unit of writing works as a container for a cognitive ground in which ideas are planted, as living things, so that \mathcal{I} can return to them regularly and by the attention making them grow in my mind, which grows on this occasion out of itself, of its closure, but also so that they make each other grow, just as plants in synergetic agriculture. Thus from a personal point of view, the decomposition of the script into units of meaning should be done according to the difficulty of the attention to focus on a certain cognitive area, this focus demanding the transcendental negation of the remainder of my cognition. Since this negation necessitates some effort and for this effort \mathcal{I} need a reason, \mathcal{I} have to choose what areas of cognition \mathcal{I} should consider: I think that a good criterion for this choice is the richness of the ideas which come to my mind when \mathcal{I} am there, as well as the richness of interactions between these ideas - in this case the gain in terms of growth overcomes the effort of transcendental negation. A unit of meaning thought as a container is not bound in its presence in and action on my own mind, however there is a point from which its material extension - the text - reaches unity in my perception field, for which there is a natural form. \mathcal{I} know that this point is reached when \mathcal{I} can see a structure in the text which, altogether with its moments (which coincide with important turns in the course of my reflection), becomes present in my mind outside of the focused consideration towards the unit of writing itself, in particular in cognitive situations in which the connection with these ideas is unexpected, generating more original ideas.

When the container reaches this point, the text reaches a definite form. There is a certain pleasure for the author there, and when writing towards the others, a satisfaction for having done what the society of others expects: intellectual *production*. Furthermore when \mathcal{I} have this kind of pleasure, \mathcal{I} tend to seek how to replicate it; \mathcal{I} tend to consider texts which do not reach a definite form in a negative way, and see writing as a production function more than a tool for my reflection. When writing towards myself, however, containers that \mathcal{I} create represent an attraction force in my mind towards a certain area of cognition, a tendency in the movement of my thoughts. The closure of such a tendency in my thoughts is good, for it is the sign of opening for my world, but does not have to happen systematically, and sometimes my thoughts keep running in some direction without end. But I believe that the only thing that matters is that my thoughts do not run in circles inside the current extension of my mind.

From a practical point of view, the unit of script provides me with some cognitive space, isolated from quotidian experience, whose extension is unlimited and whose isolation makes it easier to focus attention on certain areas of cognition, and \mathcal{I} can project in the container what \mathcal{I} find in this area: this way \mathcal{I} can anchor this area as such - whose extension and limits are not present to my mind, contrarily to what it *contains* - into the limits of the container. In this created space \mathcal{I} have more control on the presence and absence of ideas on my mind, which thus can co-exist in a more organized way than how they appear without this effort.

From a more social point of view, the work of presence towards the others also involves the possibility for others to identify me, with some intellectual program which provides some coherence to the set of units of script that \mathcal{I} create, delimitating an area in which \mathcal{I} am able to actually make some progress and not standing on the surface of things: it is of course a matter

of trust but also of the possibility to think about this identity outside of the consideration of my work (just as the ideas anchored in my script acquire singular existence when \mathcal{I} can think of them in my raw experience) and eventually branching the 'I' which is constituted in the script to other directions that \mathcal{I} could not think about in isolation. The existence of this 'I' towards the others is constructed and legitimated in the production of the script, which is visible for others. \mathcal{I} might coalesce myself to this 'I' out-there and, in doubts, compare this 'I' to the others, and base this comparison on the only available criteria: quantity of units and thematic extension of the script. I believe that refusing to exist out-there through the script is not a solution. \mathcal{I} should instead prevent myself from coalescing myself with my identity out-there and find some rational criteria for sharing parts of my script. With some reflection, I arrived at some criteria which, although rooting the collective valuation of intellectuals and researchers, is not identical to it; grasping it through the practice of writing could help me deviate my mental trajectory in order to focus more on it than collective expectation.

Beyond constructing a visible identity out-there, \mathcal{I} believe that it is also important to explain in a short text the coherence of the collection of my scripts, through which \mathcal{I} am able to guide the reader to an understanding of this identity, overarching the multiplicity with a concept and relating each unit of script to this concept. The many units of meaning could then be considered more as a technical support for this overall vision. Such an exposition has the advantage that my identity out-there is not left to the potentially superficial appreciation of the reader. Since \mathcal{I} understand for myself why \mathcal{I} am writing this short text, \mathcal{I} can see its form in a more abstract way, opening possibilities. In particular in the same way as some philosophers chose to communicate their ideas under the form of novels instead of structured essays, current technology allows the construction of an identity out-there to be more interactive, guiding in a more refined way the reader in the maze of the author's mind. As well as particular units of script, this identity is an artefact and does not have to be set once and for all once it is constituted; there has to be however a 'right' equilibrium between change and coherence. There is no objective way to address this difficulty, but I believe that the overarching concept should be at the same time essential to my world and not understood. From that concept \mathcal{I} should derive multiple strategies in order to understand it better - multiple because one strategy alone can fail. The interest of such a concept is that it delineates my identity as a writer by excluding in principle some possibilities, while leaving open the actual outcome of the writing practice. When \mathcal{I} consider some change in this identity, this is because an area of thoughts which lie outside of it in its current form can affect it; \mathcal{I} can choose either to integrate it or to reject it. Of course I can not consider all the ideas that come to my mind for otherwise \mathcal{I} would not make any progress in the directions that \mathcal{I} defined. As well I can not keep this directions completely fixed. There is no objective criterion but I usually choose to integrate novel directions when it strongly interacts with several components of my project. I think that it is not possible to go further, for the implementation of these principles is deeply subjective, as it is close to actual experience of the subject as a writer. Such integration is possible only with this actual experience and its structure, which form the reading grid of the subject's world, in which the subject's intellect evolves.

I think that it would be interesting to keep thinking about natural ways to decompose the script into units without relying on collective standards. This may have consequences on the way we practice research collectively, materializing the practice of research in another way, in particular allowing innovation through the application of schemata coming from other contexts (economical or political for instance).

————— Transcendental problems —————

I believe that the concept of *user innovation* is one of these schema that can be applied to intellectual writing. The interpretation that I have of the interest of this concept is to point

at the fact that it is possible, contrary to common belief, for consumers of goods to create on their own some products which have non-neglectible economic potential; furthermore they often create these products because, despite the fact that they could be helpful, they are not produced by manufacturers - probably because they did not *identify* the need or because this need was expected to concern only few people. Sometimes this kind of creation leads to successful economical stories. While goods are created for the material, intellectual creations are for the mind; I believe that there is no consistent barrier which would prevent from an application of user innovation to intellectual creation: indeed, if we choose not to reduce the world to bodies and languages (a vision which A.Badiou calls democratic materialism), we can see persons as facing not only material problems but also transcendental ones (in regard to how they build their relation to the world), whose solutions can be provided under the form of a battery of concepts and ideas whose articulation creates in the mind of the reader another way of thinking which dissolves the manifestation on the mind of this problem. I should notice here that I use the word 'problem' in a different way than when we talk about mathematical problems or more generally technical ones, for they are inherently related to the relation the subject (not as a personality) has to the world: to be clear, mathematical problems for instance can be of this nature only when the subject is plainly immersed into the mathematical world, by which the relation of the subject to the world is intertwined with mathematical progression. Furthermore the way these problems are addressed does not concern the reflection that I try to develop here, for the reason that the society of knowledge has inscribed its reasons in its structure, taking for instance the production of knowledge from the accumulation of existing ones and the systematisation of knowledge creation through the combination of existing elements of knowledge. When *a posteriori* the problem in question seems to affect other persons, the tools developed to solve it should be worth sharing. In fact for user innovation to be possible for intellectual creation, the consumer has to be able to grasp the use of a concept from the understanding of the concept itself in relation to his or her own problems, and not from only authority in relation with the search of a position in the society of others, which seems idealistic. However this does not mean that it is absolutely impossible, and I think it is worth meditating on it.

From the point of view of the writer towards oneself, I think that the determination and definition of a transcendental problem is a natural way to delineate units of meaning, which is not an immediate work. As a matter of fact, willing to write without definite direction to follow, I often imagined some projects whose definition imitated in the form some of the books that I could find out-there (just as G.Orwell, about whom I will talk below, first wrote by imitating the style of authors he liked). These projects acted in reality as artefacts to get started in the practice of writing, exercise my intellect, and put on the paper some original ideas which altogether formed, it seemed, a coherent way of thinking which I wanted to materialize. Sometimes I decided to write on something, not for itself but in order for me to anchor my attention in a certain area of my cognition, and that I knew I would learn something by simply focusing my attention there and considering what I would encounter (which would derive only from the exercise of the intellect). Sometimes I would have chosen a subject for the elegance of its formulation. However all these projections are difficult to conciliate with a sincere search of meaning, since I could not focus without some self-sacrifice (the one of the open spectrum of the possible) or equivalently some relation. There are natural directions which do not involve, by definition, such a sacrifice: for instance the search for the expression of oneself's unity. However these directions, although they determine 'why' to write, are too wide to be enclosed in a unit of meaning. This does not mean that the practice of writing should start beforehand with the definition of a problem: these problems appear in the understanding of structure of the domain of cognition towards which my attention is attracted without exterior action. This means that \mathcal{I} can find what is natural for me to write about in the relation that \mathcal{I} have with the world and that \mathcal{I} should also find

in this relation the solutions to these problems - which in fact is liberating from the natural inclination to compare oneself to others. This attraction of my attention often coincides with the sense of beauty: I believe that the reason for this is that beauty is often the sign of presence - of something unseen and yet important.

Amongst possible transcendental problems, I think that in fact the ones that are the most important for myself are likely to be ones with which most people are concerned and thus worth sharing. About these problems, I think that the materialization of a coherent way to think about them is a good motivation for writing when ideas dispersed in trivial conversations do not trigger the attention of others and thus a worthy discussion on the matter, for these ideas have strength - to initiate a thread of thoughts - only when exposed altogether. This is the case for instance when these ideas are related to some analogies: an isolated analogy has low impact while a collection of such analogies, when coherent altogether, can trigger novel ideas and concepts, leading ultimately to some form of truth. Capturing the attention of someone for enough time to do a long exposition like this is most of the time difficult; on the other hand the interest of a unit of script is the implicit agreement between the writer and the reader of the indivisibility of this unit and thus the non-triviality of the script's statement.

Another difficulty which can come up when \mathcal{I} write towards myself and then towards the others is the apparant contradiction between the *subjectality* (the exposition and study of a subject in particular) and the necessity for a script which is meant to be communicated to others to be *objectal*, meaning directed towards a description of what we can recognize intersubjectively and collectively out-there - in other words what can collectively be used. I think that the contradiction is only apparant for the reason that the self is communicated to others through the particular choice of the 'subject' of the script, which is determined subjectively; moreover in the practice of writing \mathcal{I} can actually see myself more easily through the consideration of things out-there than by direct observation of myself as an object. In other words, the subjectal and objectal modes of writing are unavoidably intertwined.

———— The *practice of writing* ————

Near the end of his life, **G.Orwell** wrote *Why I write*, in which he explains the reasons why he became a writer and the meaning this had for him. I have naturally been interested in this text and similar ones by other authors. I would like to explain what I found in them for it makes clearer an important aspect of writing towards oneself.

In the beginning of his text, Orwell finds in his childhood's memory some significant inflections in his will to write, that he had developed quite early in his life. He explains in particular that what triggered this will was the solitude he felt when he was a child, which resulted in the detachment of the experience he had from the remainder of the world, which in a sense we can call his world - wide open to be explored and to be communicated to others. The description of this experience happened as a continuous 'story' about himself, 'a sort of diary existing only in the mind', I am guessing taking notes in his mind of everything that he could observe in his world, experiencing freedom and pleasure of creation in the language. This purely aesthetic pleasure is one of the main categories of abstract reasons he exposes in this text for a writer, together with 'sheer egoism', the exposition of truth and political impact. I actually don't believe that this spectrum is exhaustive: for instance I found in *L'expérience intérieure* of G.Bataille the obsession of reaching the limits of the possible - in terms of thoughts and perception - which I think does not enter in one of these categories. It is possible that Orwell was thinking, for this categorization, about writing as the creation of an object out-there (the text) rather than the practice of writing itself. However this categorization is enough for Orwell to situate himself and the way he evolved in his thoughts about the meaning of writing. Although he categorized his early self as anything but a political writer, the striking events of the XXth century transformed

and naturally led him to write for communicating a political message (against totalitarianism), in such a way that the purpose of the message is combined with the purpose of art. I believe that the main factor which led him to question the reasons why he had to write was for him to be able to look back on his work and be able to find meaning in it and not simply pure exercises of style. I understand the difficulty of this question because I was not able to write thus far for the reason that I required to myself that what I would write should be meaningful. While Orwell found the formulation of what is meaningful to him in the practice of writing, I have to find this formulation in order to direct myself in the upstream projection of writing. Furthermore for Orwell "one can write nothing readable unless one constantly struggles to efface one's own personality", an affirmation with which I agree only to some extent. Indeed for a text to be meaningful, it has to open the other's world and make the reader see something out-there, something that he or she does not see already. In particular it should not impose the subjective views of the author through the seduction of the other's mind. On the other hand writing consists for me, by the re-cognition of myself, to open my own world into a wider world than the one I was projected in, enriching my perception of things. When \mathcal{I} choose to share my thoughts, \mathcal{I} do not necessarily try to impose my thoughts on others: sometimes the reason is simply to throw a bottle to the sea - of all the possible ideas and opinions that come to the other's mind - not knowing what in what I say can be interesting for others. In a sense it is an act of creation of communication, in the hope that another person may perceive in the expression of my thoughts something which opens his or her world and that this person would like to join me on the same path. As a matter of fact, an act of communication necessarily involves the self, however it does not have to negate the other.

I found in **J. Didion's** *version* of *Why I write* another way to see the practice of writing for oneself: her 'why' is determined not by ideas but her raw quotidian experience, in particular some of her experiences which, amongst trivial ones, appear to have some mysterious beauty. I am guessing here that her novels are centered on her mind around these singular experiences, for they open her world through wonder and then irresistible desire of unveiling that which appears - signified by beauty - in them. What appears as the raw sensation of presence becomes, then, in the practice of writing, alive characters whose singularity and complexity appear more clearly. Whether these characters are ultimately a construction of the author's mind or exist by themselves in some way does not matter here; they are present and alive to the author - and furthermore the eventual reader - through the practice of writing, just as the others are made present to ourselves in the act of communication. Although the relation that the author has with her characters is personal, these characters ultimately are present in the novel by themselves and represent for the reader some possible others with whom they can engage in a relation with, that is as well personal; in a sense this is an example of one way the personality of the author can appear in the text without negating the reader. I am also guessing that the text itself serves, from the point of view of the author, as the support - almost as a pretext - for the communication of the singular experiences which trigger the creation of the novel. For me writing is a way to collect thoughts that I find singular and connected to a lot of other ideas I have, and find in this collection and coexistence of these ideas together a source of intellectual creation, ultimately leading to the discovery of a conceptual structure which lies under the cohesion of my thoughts, just as the characters 'explain' the sensation of presence in singular experiences. Before that, when actually creating the text, this text has the function of making present towards oneself and ultimately the others, these singular ideas or experiences that \mathcal{I} am contemplating. What triggers the practice of writing is the feeling of incompleteness of the experience as it is for me in the moment and attracts my attention. On a more personal note, I do not practice research in order to construct knowledge, but as an adventure of the mind in which knowledge is only a tool.

In *Qu'est ce que la littérature ?* (II. Pourquoi écrire ?), **J.-P.Sartre**, talks more abstractly about this action of *opening the world* of the other through the script, making it the function of the intellectual to unveil the world for the reader and thus augmenting his or her freedom - of course with the cost of abandoning one's freedom while reading the text. From the point of view of the writer this function makes him or her essential to the world because the text has an impact on it. On the other hand the function of the writer or intellectual - and I believe this is the motivation of Sartre - justifies its position in the society. In particular here Sartre separates himself from Kant for whom the practice of writing is directed towards the writer - in search for 'aesthetic joy' - the reader being non essential. For Sartre the reader is essential because the writer has a function whose essence lies in the relation with the reader and the aesthetic joy is a tool which signifies a 'rigorous harmony between objectivity and subjectivity' in the practice of writing. I would position myself in a somewhat intermediate position between these two visions: aesthetic joy is fundamental when there is no justification emanating from the society of the others (without this no one would write). On the other hand, this kind of justification can be corrupted and can render the script which results from it meaningless. Aesthetic joy can also be corrupted in egoism, but the writer who writes for oneself and not for others writes for a kind of aesthetic joy which can not be corrupted this way, and ultimately serves a function which is not dictated by the other.

I also took a look at **B.Russell's** *How I write*, and found a resemblance with my own difficulties when it comes to actual writing: the kind of difficulties which come from constraints that one applies to one's own speech. For Russell it seems that the constraint is that of the meaning function of what is said: every thing that is said should have meaning and the form of the text should derive from its meaning. Difficulties come when this constraint is applied beforehand and not after writing a first version: with it comes the 'fear that it was never going to come right' and the hesitation in front of the paper when projecting thoughts on it. This hesitation is else resolved when there is certainty about the meaning, and thus the form is determined by it, or nothing can be written. Some advices that one can find at the end of the text are addressed to young professors and thus to the writers who perform a function. I would like to deviate from this way of thinking, for the reason that such view on writing prevents one from writing about things which are formed only through the practice of writing itself, therefore binding the writer's freedom.

Some writers write mainly towards themselves, some others towards the others, and some (if not all) are situated in tension between these two ways. Ultimately this *problem* is resolved in a particular practice of writing: *I* should write not only in the projection of the product of writing (a unit of script) but for what writing is itself. Contrary to Orwell I do not intend to find an answer but to initiate questions.

————— An existential practice —————

For me writing, besides academic purpose, has taken the form of taking notes on several subjects related to my direct experiences and regularly revisiting them in order to look at them in a different way, conceptualizing them in order to make my relation to the world evolve along with the practice of writing. Progressively, I chose to allocate a significant part of my time to this practice; one of the reasons for this being that writing is one of the rare things that one can do with very few material constraints (although I do appreciate to write on a computer rather than several pieces of paper, it is not ultimately necessary). In fact in doing so I depend only on my own self and experience in order to construct my existence, since what I write about lies in me at all time. It makes me free because I do not depend on external factors and situations in order to do what I enjoy doing - and the joy that I have while writing is never goes away. What I write about consists mainly in some intellectual problems that I formulate out of the observation

of my experience, some of them appearing along with experience itself and some while writing down ideas. The problems themselves make any experience enjoyable in the sense that I can extract from this experience something that sheds light on one of them. I like to think of the structure of my relation to experience as that of a philosopher's stone, since it actually changes lead (the raw experience) into gold, while the stone symbolises the fact that \mathcal{I} can hold it in my 'intellectual hand'. Most of the things that I write are not part of an identifiable unit of script: I still got into the habit of writing down ideas whenever they come to my mind for the reason this leaves my mind unpreoccupied by the fear of losing some interesting thoughts which I would like to remember later in order to be able to let my mind explore other ideas which come at the moment. When I read them later they become more present in my mind and enrich the conceptualization of my experience. This is one example of the writing for itself which is not the writing practice aimed at resulting in the production of a script: here the text acts as a support for the reflection. For some time I have taken notes only in a large 'bag of ideas', a simple text file in my computer which contains all of them, in a completely random order. With time I identified some connections between some of these ideas, some of these connections leading to other ones; multiple connections then form some 'area of questioning' which can be formulated ultimately as a 'problem'. When this happens it can be frustrating not to be able to find precisely the location in the bag of ideas of the notes that I have taken on the subject - as a matter of fact I could not create an 'addressing structure' in which to place them because the intuition of this structure only appeared along with writing. It is rather natural then to write for the purpose of the structure, however it is difficult to do so when structure is the only purpose: if I focus on structure along with writing, it has to change any time there is some input of thoughts in the text because the current structure does not take them into account. Quite rapidly the text becomes again a bag of ideas, and the practice itself becomes frustrating. In my current practice, I would rather choose either to leave the structure for later (using the text as a container) or the exposition of a solution to a problem. In the second case the structure appears naturally as the purpose of the text is to bring the reader closer to an understanding of the solution: the structure reflects how to arrive at such an understanding. In the first case the structure is determined naturally by the recurrence of some important ideas or the perception of some turns in the course of thoughts - here the subject which defines the container has to be sufficiently local for these identifications to be possible. When the structure is imposed in such a way, one can overcome the difficulty of projecting ideas on the paper with a distortion in their form and thus their beauty, especially when these ideas are close to the 'I' (when this is the case, this projection acts as a negation of the 'I'). This is also another reason for localising - at least at the beginning - the subject of a unit of script: the more it is local, the more there is distance from the 'I' and thus non-identification (this separation condition is parallel to A.Schopenhaur's separation of will and representation, which could serve as a tool for the writer himself or herself and not only for the society in the construction of a collective discourse). As well the identity of my script (the totality of my units of script) is constituted along with its construction, as \mathcal{I} can progressively combine units of meaning and ideas and concepts located in them in order to formulate more and more precisely this identity. Here units of meaning act in the same way as words in the composition of a sentence, factually defining the identity of my script, progressively unfolding the 'I' by climbing back the consideration towards things out-there up until the very locus where this consideration emanates - in a sense this 'I' is the alpha and the omega of creation - which is made possible by the progressive detachment of an objective view on the self from the phenomenal identification with the 'I'. The representation of myself that \mathcal{I} construct this way is fundamentally different from the one obtained by direct introspection, which consists in extracting the experiential imprint of the 'I', positive (what I am) but partial, in the sense that it consists in a position in a sort of map of all the possible ways of being and in particular others

that \mathcal{I} know - thus negative (what I am not) but more complete. The purpose of this map however is not limited to understanding myself but also to move in the space that it represents, in other words change myself in such a way that this change depends only on my will. Writing is a privileged mode for operating this change, because the definition of the self has an essential part in the language (meaning the collection of associations between concepts and identified parts of experiences), in which are encoded the many differences with the others: moving in this space means regulating my language, which is done by writing (because writing consists in reassembling in different configurations the part of my experience in order to constitute other words).

————— Some principles of the practice itself —————

When \mathcal{I} see writing as an existential practice, the way \mathcal{I} am practicing should not only depend on the outcome but also on the way in which it is taking place is at the moment of the practice. I believe for instance that it is important to construct a text - when the matter is determined - into multiple *layers*: when I write mathematical texts for instance, I usually begin with caring about the coherence of the reasoning that I adopt in the text and more generally about the development of my thoughts along the text, all this in natural language. Once the thoughts are projected on the paper, it is possible to transform the text in order to render visible some unconscious ways of the reasoning, which have to be thought until the whole reasoning becomes completely clear. Until this point I prefer to write only in plain language with words that are not of formalism: the formalism serves the communication of a reasoning in a non ambiguous way but it is not necessarily its constitution, and precision is useless when the structure is not yet definitive. When the structure is settled I add precision. The last layer consists in optimizing the access to information which is relevant to the reader - in doing so I am targeting some expected readers of *a priori* multiple possible profiles, each of which will extract specific informations from the script.

Across units of scripts, I found that in practice the thoughts which derive from hindsight on my own consideration towards what \mathcal{I} have already anchored in a text and what in my experience relate to it - as it is anchored it is allowed to be present unexpectedly in the experience - are richer than when choosing another direction to look at - as in the will to make my vision 'cover' what is visible conceptually. In fact the choice of self-restriction of the consideration to some thematic continuity allows more creation: this continuity does not have to be on the nature of what \mathcal{I} should expect to see, and simply on the most abstract phenomenal proximity. In this progression, ideas anchored in the last units of script act as tools in the completion of the phenomenal field that the progression opens, and this work also sheds light on the tools themselves.

Most of the time I am having in mind multiple possible directions and it is not completely obvious how to choose one over the others (in the time of writing). I do not have a precise criterion for this choice but I think it should consist in a combination of multiple practices, amongst which some artificial recurrence: in fact often times one leaves an area of cognition thinking that there is nothing left to see while coming back to it reveals that this is not the case, even without effort - it is probable that information has been processed in between allowing to perceive things more clearly. The combination should also involve following ideas when they appear to the mind, grasping this way the occasion to explore them in depth, which would demand more effort later, in particular for it would have to involve remembering these ideas, why they were interesting, how they are connected to other ideas, etc.

————— Withstanding social pressure —————

For the writer who writes towards oneself, since writing is a way to understand oneself, this writer should encounter the (universal) problem of *why do I write ?*. This problem, when pro-

jected in the social dimension, depends upon the structure of the society at the time which has itself an impact on the possibility of the practice of writing, of sharing scripts, and what is expected to be communicated or not: these determinations are different according to the function of the writer in the society (professor, intellectual, researcher, etc), whose spectrum of possibilities depends itself on the culture. From this problem derive multiple other ones such as: *how can I stay myself intellectually ?* or *how to evaluate the quality of an intellectual work without having to rely on academic authority ?*. I am directly concerned with them and decided to write this short text to address this question to myself; I believe that these questions also concern several other persons: it is in fact a recognized phenomenon that the formation of researchers nowadays often progressively annihilates the wonder which was initially the reason for them to chose to exercise this function in the society of others. This phenomenon is explained well by the fact that the intellectual value that we attribute to thoughts, ways of thinking, and more practically directions of thoughts and of research, is determined according to some arbitrary criteria - including the advance towards some definite set of questions - which, although themselves determined by only few researchers or intellectuals and politics, are progressively perceived collectively as objective and thus unquestioned, entering in contradiction with the sincere pursuit of truth by individuals themselves. This social implementation of research can only result in the artefact, and meaninglessness at the same time from the individual and collective points of view. I believe that there is no other way than to resist to the pressure and when construction a project only consider the criterion of personal interest in the practice itself of research itself, and thus the natural direction taken by one's own mind. In order to counter the pressure, \mathcal{I} should be aware of it and relate my project to the directions defined by the society of others only when relevant to my project. In practice, addressing the question of 'how to prevent this pressure exerted by others from affecting the advance of this project ?' imposes considerable difficulty. I have observed some times that I tend to be 'interested' in a problem for the only reason that resolving it would value me in the eyes of the others, even if the problem itself does not stimulate my own reflection. As I do not have a definitive answer to the question, I can only recognize its importance.

The pressure of the society is also exercised under the form of productivism, which means tendency to perceive the text as a *product*, in other words a 'material' object which is made visible to the others, and writing being reduced to the production of this material object as such. On the contrary I choose to see, despite this pressure, the text as a support for my own reflection, and as such is a living thing; the cognitive borders of the text considered as a container serve as a channel for a consistent relation with the text - which consists in the observation of the mechanisms of my thoughts and their organization. Looking at the text as more than a product is in fact a key to escape from the pressure of the quantity of script - compromising its quality. Furthermore writing in order to produce consists in the creation for the use of others and not me: by the production \mathcal{I} am dispossessed of what is mine and the outcome that I get out of it is pure imagination about myself. In productivism the mind loses freedom and the practice of writing loses its purpose. In fact if \mathcal{I} see the text as the support of my reflection, \mathcal{I} need to keep considering the text itself and thus should not produce a lot: the more \mathcal{I} produce, the less time \mathcal{I} can spend for this consideration. \mathcal{I} also need to disengage from an identification of myself with the text that \mathcal{I} writing, which is difficult because this identification is natural: when \mathcal{I} write, \mathcal{I} am the cause of what is written and we identify ourselves with what we cause completely, identification which is also made by the others. The reason for disengaging from this identification is that the closer a part of myself stands to the 'I', the more comparison with others may negate this 'I', a comparison which is made, as closer to the 'I', with elementary ways - the quantity of script for instance. In practice the non-identification has to involve again a relation, not only in the recurrence of the consideration or viewing the text as a support for reflection but

also in the fact that what is written always consists solely in a step in this reflection, a partial representation to be refined indefinitely.

Thinking about the way I made the project to write in the beginning, I realize that my project was triggered by the idea of 'application' of the mode of thinking of a mathematician to the mechanics of thoughts involved in the practice of mathematics. There is an apparant contradiction between this mode of thinking, which implies the consideration of intellectual objects that one can 'hold in hand', meaning that it is possible to access everything which is possible to observe about this object (just as it is possible to access everything there is to observe about a uniformly colored cube held in hand, making it turn in every possible direction with a movement of the hand). For this to be possible, the 'dimension' of the object has to be compatible with the 'dimension' of the phenomenal field in which it appears, or at least that I can make a representation commensurable to this phenomenal field of how to access the various parts of the object. In other words the object has to be compatible to the mode of truth associated with mathematical practice. The contradiction here comes thus from the fact that one can not hold in hand strictly human 'objects' (such as a person). This contradiction leads us naturally to think that the human mind, in essence, is opposed to any form of systematization, or any construction of an overall representation of the nature of human mind. However I believe that it is a mistake which is due to the rigidity of the mode of thinking, itself enforced by the pressure of the society of others. In order to think - and thus write - about human, the mode of thinking has to be adapted to the object. Let us observe for instance that it is simpler to project thoughts on the paper in a linear way, progressively imprinting in words, without caring about precision, characterizing them well enough to be able to recall them later: the reason is that the pressure of the thinking framework is removed, and thus does not distort the object. When reconsidering all that has been written, it is difficult to find the structure of the whole by recollecting the corresponding ideas altogether, constituting an overall representation of this whole which held in mind determines the way to recompose the text locally - as naturally done when writing a mathematical text. It is possible however to follow the same track of thoughts linearly multiple times and observe regularities along the way which are progressively added to an overall representation (I believe that we conceptualize our very experience in a similar way) and used in the following readings to rewrite locally (in particular inscripting connections between parts in the text itself). The structure of the text is this way progressively constituted through this rewriting, which is possible only accepting the absence immediate control of its outcome and the coexistence of the obscure (what lies in between the dispersed registered thoughts).

I believe that the social pressure restrict even the possibility to think and ultimately understand certain things for the method imposed for communicating ideas (how we should write) is not adapted to the object. Often times we conclude, in excessive belief in the method, that it is impossible to talk about these things. Sometimes however the reason is that the mode of writing itself has to be developed even before writing in a more systematic way.

———— Rethinking the social position of intellectuals ————

Along this text I have considered the reasons for writing from a personal (although universal) point of view, but I think it is important to consider it also from a collective point of view: *why do we write* ? Do we write in order to increase our knowledge of the world ? If knowledge consists in the accumulation of faithful representations of cognitive regions, it is not effective if not made accessible. This leads to a paradox of intellectual productivism: the more scripts become accessible, the less a single script is. Without a proper reflection on the above question, the accumulative way of thinking about knowledge and its inscription in a system of evaluation of researchers and intellectuals may lead to the even more insignificant phenomenon of production for the purpose of production itself, and intellectuals creating problems in order to find solutions.

To think about it here I can only project on the social scale what I observe on my own. Writing is a practice of creating space for more freedom, a space outside of cognitive frameworks in which individuals are enframated and denied - I think this is the main reason why I wanted to write at the beginning. Removing these frameworks and finding oneself back consist simply in choosing to think otherwise, no matter what is thought; however in this abstract 'space' where the 'I' is free of the social pressure, there are still rules - that one may see as the direct exercise of God's will on the 'I' - which apply and for this reason *I* should try to understand them; because of their nature, *I* this understand has to take time and involvement (as a relation). In the modern society '*God is dead*' because freedom is dead in our minds, and with it the necessity of this relation: at the same time the cognitive framework which appears with the modern society removes this freedom and justifies itself by the pain that we feel when crossing the borders it defines. The very notion of happiness as a position of equilibrium in which misery vanishes is a misconception: this happiness is only what the social structure itself can provide, as much as misery. The problem is precisely that the society of others has become the origin of everything in this world, and in particular the nature of happiness, which by nature the society can not create because it lies in freedom. In the *Brave new world* of A.Huxley for instance, when the savage asks the epsilons if they would rather be free than happy, they know instinctively what to choose.

I wanted to share ideas in order to find someone who could listen to them, find in them some beauty and ultimately open my world and lead me to somewhere else. While writing I discovered that I was in fact creating artificially someone to listen to me, projected on the paper; in fact this someone is me.

I think that intellectuals should create freedom for themselves, for in doing so they create, as an exemplum, the very possibility for others to create freedom for themselves.